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Abstract	  In	   common	   with	   the	   other	   periphery	   countries	   that	   joined	   the	  euro-­‐zone	  in	  1998-­‐2000,	  Spain	  enjoyed	  ten	  years	  of	  economic	  prosperity,	  essentially	  debt-­‐financed.	   	  The	   financial	  crisis	  of	  2008	  has	  revealed	  deep	  structural	   problems	   in	   the	   euro-­‐zone,	   but	   also	   among	   Spain’s	   fiscally	  autonomous	  regions,	  which	  differ	  from	  the	  financial	  problems	  faced	  by	  the	  other	  European	  periphery	  countries.	   	  But	   the	  Spanish	  problems	  with	  de-­‐leveraging	  suggest	   further	  difficulties	   for	   the	  euro-­‐zone	  as	   it	   attempts	   to	  implement	  sterner	  budgetary	  controls	  over	  member	  states.	  	  Key	  words:	  autonomous	  regions,	  Balassa-­‐Samuelson	  effect,	  de-­‐leveraging,	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The	   fear	   of	   contagion	   among	   global	   investors	   as	   the	   debt	   crisis	   of	   the	   euro-­‐zone	  periphery	   spread	   from	  Greece	   in	   2009	   to	   Ireland	   and	   then	   to	   Portugal	  was	  whether	   the	  much	  larger	  economies	  of	  Spain	  and	  Italy	  might	  be	  next.	   	   	  These	  five	  countries	  constitute	  the	  Southern	  Western	  European	  Periphery	   (SWEP	  hereafter).	   	  The	  responses	   to	   the	  debt	  crises	   of	   the	   three	  much	   smaller	   countries	  were	   already	   proving	   inadequate	   by	   October	  2011,	   so	   if	   Spain	   stumbled	   as	   well,	   there	   was	   little	   doubt	   that	   the	   common	   currency	  experiment	  with	   the	  euro	  would	   fail	  under	   its	  current	  procedures.	   	  Major	  changes	  would	  follow,	  whether	   the	   euro-­‐zone	   remained	   intact	   or	   not.	   	   As	   events	   unfolded	   in	   2010	   and	  2011,	  however,	  it	  appeared	  to	  investors	  that	  Italy	  might	  be	  the	  real	  problem	  as	  the	  yields	  on	   Italian	   government	   debt	   rose	   slightly	   above	   those	   on	   Spanish	   government	   debt	   (see	  Figure	  1).	  	  	  
Figure	  1.	  Sovereign	  Debt	  Yields,	  SWEP	  Countries	  
	  Source:	  OECD	  Economic	  Outlook,	  Statistical	  Data	  Base.	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Figure	   1	   also	   shows	   that	   none	   of	   the	   various	   policy	   initiatives	   undertaken	   by	  European	  Union	  authorities	  since	  2008	  has	  had	  a	   long-­‐lasting	  effect	  on	  the	  pricing	  of	   the	  Euro-­‐zone’s	   sovereign	   government	   bonds.	   	  What	   caused	   this	   apparent	   unraveling	   of	   the	  euro-­‐system	  after	   it	   had	   appeared	   to	   be	  working	   so	  well	   for	   the	   first	   ten	   years	   after	   the	  establishment	   of	   the	   European	   Central	   Bank	   in	   1998?	   	  Why	   have	   none	   of	   the	  measures	  taken	  or	  announced	  had	  the	  desired	  effect	  as	  of	  the	  end	  of	  2011?	  	  The	  experience	  of	  Spain	  during	   the	   halcyon	   days	   of	   the	   euro-­‐zone	   and	   its	   subsequent	   problems	   of	   deleveraging	  after	   the	   financial	   crisis	  of	  2008	   is	   instructive	   for	   framing	  answers	   to	   those	   fundamental	  questions.	  	  More	  important,	  however,	  the	  Spanish	  experience	  is	  instructive	  for	  anticipating	  the	  probable	  effects	  of	  the	  enhanced	  budget	  oversights	  for	  the	  euro-­‐zone	  governments	  that	  were	   agreed	   upon	   in	   principle	   in	   December	   2011	   and	   confirmed	   at	   their	   meeting	   on	  January	   30,	   2012.	   	   The	   ongoing	   travails	   of	   the	   Spanish	   government	   should	   alert	   the	  architects	  of	  the	  new	  fiscal	  regime	  now	  under	  construction	  for	  the	  euro-­‐zone	  to	  potential	  problems	   in	   managing	   fiscal	   oversight	   even	   by	   a	   central	   government,	   much	   less	   by	   the	  European	  Commission.	  Below,	   we	   first	   explore	   how	   and	   why	   the	   euro-­‐system	   began	   to	   pull	   apart	   in	  September	  2008,	  apparently	  recovered	  in	  2009,	  but	  then	  exploded	  in	  2010.	   	  We	  highlight	  both	  the	  problems	  of	  credit	  bubbles	  focused	  on	  the	  rapidly	  rising	  prices	  of	  non-­‐tradeables	  in	   the	  Southern	  Western	  European	  Periphery	  (SWEP)	  countries	  and	   then	   the	  unintended	  consequences	   of	   initial	   deleveraging	   when	   the	   credit	   bubbles	   burst.	   	   Sovereign	   bonds	  appeared	   to	  be	  a	  desirable	  way	   to	  redress	   the	  balance	  sheets	  of	   the	  affected	   firms	   in	   the	  financial	  sector	  and	  the	  sovereign	  euro-­‐bonds	  all	  rose	  in	  price	  in	  response	  until	  the	  budget	  problems	   of	   first	   Ireland,	   then	   Greece,	   and	   finally	   Portugal	   became	   apparent.	   	   We	   then	  focus	  on	  the	  case	  of	  Spain,	  examining	  first	  how	  its	  economy	  flourished	  during	  the	  initial	  ten	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years	   of	   the	   euro.	   	   Regional	   political	   tensions	   were	   attenuated	   by	   lavish	   applications	   of	  credit.	   	   Finally,	  we	  venture	   a	   sober	   appraisal	   of	   Spanish	  prospects	   for	   recovery	   from	   the	  collapse	   of	   the	   euro-­‐bond	   regime,	   drawing	   out	   implications	   for	   the	   emerging	   new	   fiscal	  regime	  of	  the	  euro-­‐zone	  and	  its	  potential	  members.	  
The	  collapse	  of	  the	  sovereign	  euro-­bond	  regime	  	  It	   is	   evident	   in	   retrospect	   that	   the	   sub-­‐prime	   crisis	   in	   the	   United	   States,	   which	  culminated	  with	  the	  bankruptcy	  of	  Lehman	  Brothers	  in	  September	  2008,	  also	  marked	  the	  disruption	  of	  the	  euro-­‐system.	  	  Before	  September	  2008,	  yields	  on	  government	  bonds	  issued	  by	  all	  members	  of	   the	  euro-­‐zone	  moved	   in	   lockstep	  with	   those	  of	  Germany.	   	  During	   that	  period,	   all	   central	   government	   bonds	   denominated	   in	   euros	  were	   accepted	   on	   the	   same	  terms	  as	  collateral	  for	  loans	  from	  the	  European	  Central	  Bank.	  	  	  Afterwards,	  increasing	  	  
Figure 2. SWEP bond yields compared to France and Germany, Jan. 2007 – Jan. 2012 
	  Source:	  Bloomberg.com/quote	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differences	   appeared	   as	   the	   bonds	   issued	   by	   first	   Greece,	   then	   Ireland,	   and	   eventually	  Portugal	  were	  sold	  at	   increasing	  discounts,	   leading	   to	  higher	  yields	  compared	   to	  German	  bonds.	   	   Spain	   and	   then	   Italy	   followed	  with	   France	   showing	   some	  weaknesses	   as	   events	  unfolded	  over	  the	  following	  years.	  	  An	   interesting	   phenomenon	   appeared	   in	   2009	   as	   the	   yields	   on	   all	   euro-­‐zone	  sovereigns	  fell	   for	  a	  time,	  which	  apparently	  reassured	  European	  Union	  policymakers	  that	  the	  bold	  actions	  undertaken	  by	  the	  European	  Central	  Bank	  initially	  in	  2007	  had	  de-­‐coupled	  the	  European	  banking	  system	  from	  the	  travails	  of	  their	  Anglo-­‐American	  cousins.	  	  It	  appears	  now,	   however,	   that	   this	   episode	  was	  merely	   the	   initial	   stage	   of	   a	   general	   process	   of	   de-­‐leveraging	  by	  European	  banks,	  a	  process	  that	  is	  certain	  to	  continue	  through	  2012	  and	  likely	  beyond	  for	  several	  years.	  	  It	  is	  tempting	  to	  see	  the	  increasing	  use	  of	  credit	  default	  swaps	  by	  international	   finance	   firms	  as	  a	   common	  element	  between	   the	  sub-­‐prime	  crisis	   in	   the	  US	  and	  the	  sovereign	  debt	  crisis	  in	  the	  euro-­‐zone.	  	  	  One	  argument	  to	  explain	  why	  the	  housing	  bubble	   went	   on	   so	   long	   in	   the	   US	   is	   that	   there	   was	   no	   convenient	   way	   to	   “short”	   the	  residential	  mortgage	  backed	  securities	  (RMBS)	  that	  were	  the	  hallmark	  of	  the	  US	  financing	  of	   the	  housing	  bubble,	  much	   less	   to	   short	   the	   collateralized	  debt	  obligations	   (CDOs)	   that	  were	   ingeniously	   constructed	   from	  packages	   of	   the	   RMBSs.	   	   The	   creation	   of	   an	   index	   to	  indicate	  the	  default	  rates	  of	  various	  tranches	  of	  CDOs	  in	  2007	  finally	  provided	  the	  basis	  for	  a	  transparent	  market	  in	  credit	  default	  swaps	  on	  CDOs	  to	  emerge	  (Gorton,	  2010).	  	  	  As	  short-­‐sellers	  of	  RMBSs	  and	  CDOs	  (i.e.,	  buyers	  of	  specialized	  CDSs	  on	  these	  derivative	  securities)	  profited	   from	  the	  collapse	  of	   the	  housing	  bubble	   in	   the	  US,	   they	  turned	  their	  attention	  to	  the	  more	  easily	  developed	  market	  in	  CDSs	  on	  government	  bonds,	  including	  especially	  those	  denominated	  in	  euros.	  	  Prices	  of	  CDSs	  on	  euro-­‐government	  bonds	  thereafter	  followed	  very	  closely	  the	  yield	  spreads	  on	  euro-­‐government	  bonds.	  	  (BBVA,	  October	  2011)	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The	   policy	   response	   to	   the	   collapse	   of	   the	   sovereign	   euro-­‐bond	   regime	   by	   the	  European	  Union	  authorities	  has	  been	  consistently	  behind	  the	  curve	  as	  the	  euro	  bond	  crisis	  has	  developed.	   	   To	  date,	   there	   is	   no	  obvious	   solution	   to	   the	  Greek	  problem	   (February	  6,	  2012,	  just	  after	  the	  collapse	  of	  talks	  with	  Greek	  authorities	  and	  representatives	  of	  private	  investors).	  	  Further,	  the	  individual	  piecemeal	  steps	  that	  have	  been	  taken	  over	  the	  past	  two	  years	   seem	   to	  have	  made	   the	  problem	   increasingly	  worse,	   as	   shown	   in	  Figure	  3.	   	   There,	  yields	  of	  5	  year	  sovereign	  bonds	  of	  the	  SWEP	  countries	  are	  compared	  to	  yields	  on	  German	  bonds	  for	  the	  two	  years	  January	  2010	  through	  January	  2012.	  	  After	  each	  major	  intervention	  by	   EU	   authorities,	   or	   by	   the	   European	   Central	   Bank,	   yields	   have	   fallen,	   but	   only	   briefly	  before	  beginning	   to	   rise	   again	   as	  market	   participants	   realize	   the	   futility	   of	   the	  measures	  taken.	  	  (A	  useful	  timeline	  of	  all	  policy	  actions	  taken	  since	  December	  2005	  is	  provided	  on	  the	  ECB	  web	  site:	  http://www.ecb.int/ecb/html/crisis.en.html.)	  
Figure	  3.	  Responses	  of	  sovereign	  euro-­‐bond	  yields	  to	  policy	  actions	  by	  EU	  authorities	  since	  January	  2010.	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Source:	  Bloomberg.com/quote	  &	  European	  Central	  Bank,	  Timeline	  of	  the	  economic	  crisis,	  http://www.ecb.int/ecb/html/crisis.en.html.)	  	   The	  policy	  responses	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  have	  not	  only	  been	  “behind	  the	  curve”	  as	  the	  crisis	  has	  unfolded,	  but	  that	  they	  have	  in	  some	  measure	  prolonged	  the	  crisis	  thanks	  to	   the	   determination	   to	   preserve	   the	   euro,	   and	   to	   keep	  Greece	   in	   particular	   in	   the	   euro-­‐zone.	   	   To	   date,	   that	   determination	   has	   meant	   preserving	   the	   system	   that	   allows	   the	  European	  Central	  Bank	  to	  treat	  the	  sovereign	  government	  bonds	  of	  each	  eurozone	  member	  country	  on	  the	  same	  basis,	  despite	  differences	  in	  the	  underlying	  deficit	  and	  debt	  structures	  among	   the	   fiscally	   independent	   states.	   	   An	   interesting	   working	   paper	   published	   by	   the	  National	   Bureau	   of	   Economic	   Research	   has	   sifted	   through	   the	   data	   banks	   of	   the	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  to	  find	  country	  counterparts	  to	  each	  of	  the	  SWEP	  countries	  in	  	  
Figure	  4.	  Evolution	  of	  sovereign	  debt	  CDS	  prices,	  eurozone	  countries	  and	  comparable	  
non-­eurozone	  countries.	  2005-­2011,	  quarterly	  averages.	  
	  
	  Source:	  Aizenman,	  J.	  et	  al.	  (2011),	  Figure	  2,	  p.	  40.	  	  Note:	  The	  comparison	  country	  for	  Spain	  is	   South	   Africa;	   for	   Greece,	   Panama;	   for	   Ireland,	   Malaysia;	   for	   Italy,	   Mexico;	   and	   for	  Portugal,	  Colombia.	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  terms	  of	  their	  central	  government	  budget	  situations	  leading	  up	  to	  the	  2008	  crisis.	  	  Figure	  4	  from	   their	   paper	   shows	   that	   for	   each	   member	   of	   the	   euro-­‐zone,	   regardless	   of	   their	  counterpart	   country,	   the	   effect	   of	   the	   2008	   crisis	   has	   been	   worse	   than	   in	   comparably	  indebted	  countries	  and	  it	  has	  been	  prolonged.	  	  No	  doubt	  this	  is	  due	  to	  the	  uncertainty	  over	  what	  measures	  will	  be	  taken	  by	  the	  euro-­‐zone	  authorities	  as	  well	  as	  doubts	  whether	  the	  	  announced	  measures	  will	  have	  the	  intended	  effect	  of	  restoring	  the	  previous	  regime.	  	  	  As	  we	  argue	   below,	   the	   Spanish	   experience	   in	   dealing	   with	   the	   crisis	   should	   make	   market	  participants	  doubt	  that	  the	  actions	  taken	  to	  date	  will	  ever	  restore	  the	  previous	  euro-­‐bond	  regime.	  	  The	  fundamental	  factor	  that	  was	  common	  to	  both	  the	  sub-­‐prime	  crisis	  in	  the	  US	  and	  the	  European	  sovereign	  bond	  crisis	  was	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  spending	  bubbles	  sustained	  by	  access	  to	  cheap	  financing.	  	  Housing	  and	  consumer	  durables	  were	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  US	  case,	  as	   in	   the	   Irish	  and	  Spanish	  cases,	  but	   the	  spending	  splurges	   in	  Greece	  and	  Portugal	  were	  less	  in	  housing	  than	  in	  government	  services	  and	  infrastructure	  projects.	   	  Italy	  remains	  sui	  
generis,	   as	   does	   Iceland,	  which	  may	   best	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   gigantic	   hedge	   fund	   run	   by	  incompetents	   (Lewis,	   2010).	   	   There	   are	   common	   themes	   for	   the	   problems	   of	   each	  European	  periphery	   country	  under	   the	  euro-­‐system’s	  operating	   rules	   for	   its	   first	  decade,	  however,	  namely	  access	   to	  cheap	   financing	   through	   the	   facilities	  of	   the	  European	  Central	  Bank	  and	  relatively	  more	  rapid	   increases	   in	  prices	  of	  non-­‐tradables	  (service	  sector	   labor,	  land,	  and	  housing)	  in	  the	  poorest	  countries.	  	  	  	  The	  experience	  of	   the	  European	  periphery	  countries	  within	   the	  common	  currency	  area	   recalled	   the	   Balassa-­‐Samuelson	   effect	   that	   economists	   noted	   in	   the	   1960s	   when	  developing	   countries	   began	   to	   open	   their	   economies	   while	   joining	   the	   Bretton	   Woods	  system	  of	  fixed	  exchange	  rates.	  	  Neal	  (2007),	  explained:	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The	  explanation	   for	   the	  Balassa-­‐Samuelson	  effect	   is	   that	  poor	  countries	  are	  poor	  mainly	  because	  they	  do	  not	  trade	  very	  much	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world,	  but	  that	  also	  means	   that	   their	   price	   levels	   are	   low	   relative	   to	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   world.	   	   The	  consequence	   of	   not	   trading	   much	   is	   that	   their	   agricultural	   and	   manufacturing	  sectors,	   protected	   from	   competition,	   become	   less	   productive	   relative	   to	   more	  advanced	   countries,	   and	   wage	   incomes	   are	   correspondingly	   lower.	   	   Much	   of	   the	  economy’s	   output	   becomes	   non-­‐tradable	   therefore.	   	   Trade	   barriers	   protect	   their	  jobs	   in	   manufacturing	   and	   agriculture	   while	   most	   services	   are	   inherently	   non-­‐tradable.	   	   The	   general	   level	   of	   consumer	  prices	  will	   also	  be	   low,	   the	   result	   of	   low	  money	  wages	  throughout	  the	  economy.	  Once	   trade	   opens	   up	   with	   the	   more	   advanced	   countries	   of	   the	   world,	  however,	   prices	   of	   tradable	   goods	   in	   the	   backward	   countries	   tend	   to	   rise	   very	  quickly	  toward	  the	  common	  world	  price.	  	  They	  are	  clearly	  doing	  that	  already	  in	  the	  accession	  countries,	  given	  the	  removal	  of	  the	  previous	  trade	  barriers	  that	  prevented	  trade	  between	  east	  and	  west	  Europe.	  	  As	  wages	  rise	  in	  the	  now-­‐tradable	  sectors	  of	  the	  developing	  economy	  in	  response	  to	  the	  gains	  from	  trade,	  the	  wages	  in	  the	  non-­‐tradable	   sectors	   of	   the	   developing	   economy	   will	   rise	   as	   well,	   raising	   the	   general	  price	  level.	  	  The	  more	  rapidly	  their	  trade	  expands	  relative	  to	  their	  trading	  partners,	  the	  more	  rapidly	  will	   their	  price	   level	  rise	  as	  well	   relative	   to	   their	  more	  advanced	  trading	  partners.	  	  (Neal,	  2007,	  p.	  304)	  As	   the	  European	  periphery	  countries	   that	   joined	   the	  euro	  by	  2002	  were	   forced	   to	  maintain	  a	   fixed	  nominal	  exchange	  rate	  with	   their	  more	  advanced	  trading	  partners,	   their	  real	   exchange	   rates	   continued	   to	   appreciate	   as	   long	   as	   their	   domestic	   inflation	   rates	  continued	   to	   be	   higher	   than	   those	   in	   the	   more	   advanced	   euro-­‐zone	   economies.	   	   Neal	  concluded	  that	  the	  accession	  countries	  joining	  the	  European	  Union	  en	  masse	  in	  2004	  were	  “well-­‐advised	  to	  delay	  joining	  the	  euro-­‐zone	  until	  their	  price	  levels	  are	  close	  to	  those	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  EU.”	  	  (p.	  394)	  The	  object	  lesson	  for	  the	  poorer	  countries	  that	  had	  already	  joined	  the	   euro-­‐zone	   by	   2002,	   however,	   was	   that	   they	   could	   now	   borrow	   at	   favorable	   interest	  rates	   from	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   world	   and	   apply	   the	   increased	   supply	   of	   funds	   to	   whatever	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projects	   they	   desired.	   	   This	   proved	   to	   be	   housing	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Ireland	   and	   Spain,	  government	  services	  in	  Greece,	  and	  government	  construction	  in	  Portugal,	  but	  in	  each	  case	  the	  most	  desirable	  investment	  was	  clearly	  in	  non-­‐tradable	  goods	  or	  services.	  The	  Spanish	  case	  has	  unique	   features	  due	   to	   the	  size	  and	  diversity	  of	   the	  country,	  but	  also	  due	  to	  its	  prior	  economic	  and	  financial	  history.	  	  We	  examine	  first	  how	  the	  Spanish	  participated	   in	  the	  common	  response	  of	   low-­‐income	  countries	  to	  higher	  rates	  of	   inflation	  than	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  euro-­‐zone,	  first	  by	  increasing	  employment	  and	  then	  by	  indulging	  in	  a	  housing	   bubble	   until	   the	   global	   financial	   crisis	   of	   2008.	   	  We	   note	   the	   common	   response	  after	   the	  crisis	  by	   financial	  markets,	  which	  then	  began	  to	  price	  explicitly	   the	  country	  risk	  for	  the	  bonds	  of	  each	  peripheral	  country.	  	  To	  determine	  how	  likely	  contagion	  is	  to	  spread	  to	  Spain,	  we	  explore	  the	  unique	  features	  of	  the	  Spanish	  experience	  that	  emerge	  from	  Spain’s	  regional	  diversity	  and	  disparities.	   	  Lessons	  from	  each	  region	  may	  be	  applicable	  to	  smaller	  countries,	  and	  overall	  lessons	  are	  to	  be	  learned	  for	  larger	  countries,	  such	  as	  Poland,	  still	  not	  a	  member	  of	  the	  euro-­‐zone	  seven	  years	  after	  becoming	  a	  member	  of	  the	  European	  Union,	  or	  Turkey,	  still	  not	  a	  member	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  much	  less	  of	  the	  euro-­‐zone.	  The	  most	  obvious	  theme	  is	  that	  the	  weaker	  a	  country’s	  fiscal	  condition	  was	  before	  entry	   into	   the	   euro-­‐system,	   the	   greater	  was	   the	   government’s	   incentive	   to	   join.	   	   Once	   a	  country	  was	  a	  full	  member	  of	  the	  euro,	  with	  no	  exchange	  rate	  flexibility	  against	  the	  other	  member	   countries,	   the	   European	   Central	   Bank	   was	   committed	   to	   loan	   euros	   against	  collateral	  consisting	  of	  any	  member	  country’s	  central	  government	  debt.	  	  	  As	  a	  direct	  result,	  the	  effective	  yields	  on	  the	  standard	  ten-­‐year	  bonds	  issued	  by	  each	  government	  converged	  to	   essentially	   the	   level	   of	   the	   German	   government’s	   bonds.	   	   	   The	   larger	   the	   amount	   of	  outstanding	   government	   debt	   already	   incurred	   by	   a	   country,	   the	   greater	  was	   the	   nearly	  immediate	  reduction	  in	  interest	  expenses.	  	  	  All	  parties	  recognized	  this,	  so	  the	  officials	  of	  the	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European	  Central	  Bank	  were	  consistent	  in	  stating	  that	  countries	  with	  weaker	  fiscal	  regimes	  had	   to	   begin	   making	   fiscal	   reforms	   and	   structural	   reforms	   in	   their	   labor	   and	   capital	  markets	  so	  that	  they	  could	  converge	  toward	  meeting	  the	  Maastricht	  criteria	  of	  sustainable	  long-­‐run	  debt	  and	  deficit	   levels	  (taken	  as	  Debt/GDP	  of	  60%	  and	  Deficit/GDP	  of	  3%).	   	  But	  the	   moral	   hazard	   problem	   arose	   throughout	   the	   euro-­‐zone	   for	   all	   governments	   whose	  leaders	   felt	   it	   was	   imperative	   to	   meet	   other,	   more	   pressing	   political	   problems	   before	  confronting	  reforms	  in	  labor	  and	  capital	  markets	  (Neal,	  ch.	  5).	  	  
The	  Spanish	  economy	  during	  the	  “ten	  good	  years”	  of	  the	  sovereign	  eurobond	  regime	  In	  the	  Spanish	  case,	  full	  advantage	  of	  the	  lower	  interest	  rates	  on	  government	  bonds	  was	  taken	  to	  help	  resolve	  regional	  conflicts,	  the	  intensity	  of	  which	  was	  evident	  in	  separatist	  movements	   in	   the	   Catalan	   and	   Basque	   regions.	   	   These	   also	   happened	   to	   have	   the	  major	  industries	  that	  were	  hurt	  most	  when	  their	  real	  exchange	  rate	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  euro-­‐zone	  economy	  appreciated.	   	  As	  the	  economies	  expanded	  throughout	  Spain,	  so	  did	  employment,	  but	  economists	  noted	  with	  increasing	  alarm	  that	  productivity	  did	  not	  rise.	  	  Figure	  5	  shows	  that	  increased	  immigration,	  especially	  from	  Latin	  America,	  provided	  much	  of	  the	  additional	  labor	   but	   native	   Spaniards	   entered	   the	   formal	   labor	   force	   as	   well,	   increasing	   their	  participation	  rate	   in	   the	   labor	   force	   from	  a	  European-­‐wide	   low	  level	  of	  48.0%	  in	  1989	  to	  65.6%	   in	   2007,	   almost	   exactly	   the	   average	   level	   for	   all	   12	   countries	   then	   in	   the	   euro.	  (Eurostat)	  	  In	  this	  sense	  only,	  convergence	  to	  the	  levels	  of	  more	  advanced	  trading	  partners	  did	  occur.	  	  	  But	  employment	  grew	  mainly	  in	  construction	  and	  services,	  not	  in	  manufacturing	  or	  in	   more	   high-­‐tech	   sectors,	   so	   that	   total	   factor	   productivity	   remained	   stagnant	   over	   the	  period	   1999-­‐2007.	   	   Meanwhile,	   total	   factor	   productivity	   in	   the	   euro-­‐zone	   grew	   at	   an	  average	  annual	  rate	  of	  0.5%	  and	  in	  the	  US	  at	  0.9%	  (Eurostat).	  	  The	  focus	  of	  growth	  in	  labor	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force	  participation	  was	  on	  the	  non-­‐tradable	  sectors	  of	   the	  economy,	  diverting	   investment	  from	  areas	  where	  advanced	  technology	  was	  needed	  to	  maintain	  Spanish	  competitiveness	  in	  international	  trade.	  	  	  
Figure	  5.	  	  Sources	  of	  employment	  growth	  in	  Spain.	  
	  Source:	  Juan	  F.	  Jimeno,	  ed.,	  Spain	  and	  the	  euro:	  the	  first	  ten	  years,	  Bank	  of	  Spain,	  2009	  
Figure	  6.	  	  SWEP	  Productivity	  Levels	  Compared,	  2000-­2011.	  
	  Source:	  OECD,	  Economic	  Outlook,	  No.	  90,	  October	  2011.	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Figure	   6	   above	   shows	   how	   badly	   Spain	   lagged	   in	   labor	   productivity	   even	   in	  comparison	  to	  the	  other	  periphery	  countries,	  and	  to	  the	  average	  level	  for	  the	  euro-­‐zone	  as	  a	  whole.	   	   The	   slight	   improvement	   since	   2008	   is	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   stunning	   increases	   in	  unemployment.	  Meanwhile,	   the	   generally	   higher	   rate	   of	   inflation	   in	   Spain	   than	   in	   the	   rest	   of	   the	  euro-­‐zone	   or	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   European	   Union	   meant	   that	   its	   real	   exchange	   rate	   kept	  appreciating	   relative	   to	   the	   other	   trading	   partners	   in	   Europe.	   	   The	   higher	   real	   exchange	  rate,	   combined	   with	   lagging	   total	   factor	   productivity	   in	   the	   Spanish	   economy	   put	   even	  more	  pressure	  on	  the	  current	  account.	  	  	  	  Capital	  imports	  generally	  kept	  the	  overall	  balance	  of	  payments	  equilibrated	  without	   loss	  of	   foreign	   reserves,	  but	   these	   came	  at	   the	  price	  of	  increasing	   indebtedness,	   first	   for	   the	   government,	   then	   for	   Spanish	   corporations,	   and	  finally	  for	  Spanish	  households	  as	  the	  housing	  bubble	  came	  to	  the	  Spanish	  countryside.	  Figure	  7	  shows	  the	  changing	  pattern	  of	  indebtedness	  by	  sector	  as	  Spain	  financed	  its	  extensive	  growth	  after	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  euro.	  	  From	  household	  net	  savings	  covering	  the	  debts	   of	   both	   firms	   and	   the	   government	   before	   adoption	   of	   the	   euro	   in	   1999,	   financing	  switched	  to	  firms	  drawing	  upon	  foreign	  savings.	  	  The	  attractiveness	  of	  low	  interest	  rates	  on	  debt	  that	  led	  Spanish	  firms	  to	  see	  increasing	  levels	  of	  debt	  eventually	  drew	  in	  households	  as	  well,	  who	  borrowed	  heavily	  to	  invest	  in	  housing,	  starting	  in	  2005,	  as	  shown	  in	  Figure	  8.	  The	   influx	   of	   foreign	   labor	   combined	   with	   foreign	   capital	   were	   signs	   that	   the	  Balassa-­‐Samuelson	   effect	  was	   showing	   up	   as	   the	   Spanish	   economy	   continued	   to	   become	  more	  open	  while	  maintaining	  a	  fixed	  exchange	  rate	  with	  its	  major	  trading	  partners	  as	  part	  of	   its	   commitment	   to	   the	   common	   currency.	   	   After	   a	   brief	   pause	   in	   Spain’s	   growing	  openness	   when	   making	   the	   adjustments	   needed	   to	   be	   among	   the	   first	   members	   of	   the	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common	  currency	  in	  2000,	  openness	  continued	  to	  increase	  right	  through	  the	  crisis	  until	  the	  end	  of	  2011	  (Figure	  9).	  	  	  
Figure	  7.	  	  Sources	  of	  financing	  by	  sector	  in	  Spain.	  
	  	  Source:	  Juan	  F.	  Jimeno,	  ed.,	  Spain	  and	  the	  euro:	  the	  first	  ten	  years,	  Bank	  of	  Spain,	  2009.	  
Figure	  8.	  	  The	  Housing	  Bubble	  in	  Spain	  compared	  to	  others	  
	  The	  mounting	  pressures	  of	  the	  housing	  bubble,	  largely	  financed	  by	  the	  45	  regional	  savings	   and	   loan	   banks,	   (Cajas	   de	   Ahorros)	   and	  mostly	   in	   the	   coastal	   regions	   to	   provide	  second,	  vacation	  homes	  for	  both	  Spanish	  and	  foreign	  households,	  mimicked	  in	  many	  ways	  the	  housing	  bubble	  in	  the	  US	  that	  led	  to	  the	  savings	  and	  loan	  crisis	  of	  the	  1980s.	  	  	  Much	  as	  the	  Resolution	  Trust	  Corporation	  dealt	  with	  the	  insolvent	  savings	  and	  loan	  institutions	  in	  the	  US,	  however,	  so	  the	  Spanish	  authorities	  established	  the	  state-­‐backed	  Fund	  for	  Ordered	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Bank	  Restructuring	  to	  oversee	  the	  winding	  up	  of	  the	  under-­‐capitalized	  and	  over-­‐committed	  
Figure	  9.	  Openness	  of	  the	  Spanish	  Economy,	  1960-­2008.	  
	  local	  cajas.	  	  By	  September	  2011,	  the	  original	  45	  regional	  cajas	  had	  been	  reduced	  to	  14	  and	  the	  largest,	  the	  Caja	  de	  Ahorros	  del	  Mediterráneo,	  was	  taken	  over	  by	  the	  Bank	  of	  Spain	  after	  injecting	  €5.8bn	   from	  the	  Fund	   for	  Ordered	  Bank	  Restructuring	   (FOBR).	   	  While	   repeated	  stress	   tests	   indicate	   continued	   problems	   of	   bad	   loans	   on	   the	   balance	   sheets	   of	   the	   re-­‐organized	  and	  re-­‐capitalized	  savings	  banks,	   the	  steps	   taken	  by	   the	  Spanish	  authorities	   to	  date	  are	  working	  as	  well	  as	  could	  be	  expected.	  	  It	  did	  take	  the	  Resolution	  Trust	  Corporation	  three	  full	  years	  before	  it	  wound	  up	  formal	  operations,	  and	  some	  of	  the	  unwinding	  positions	  took	  several	  more	  years	  to	  develop.	  	  
Unique	  features	  of	  Spanish	  experience	  with	  the	  euro	  Unlike	   the	   Irish	   case,	   the	   Spanish	   government	   did	   not	   and	   will	   not	   assume	   the	  liabilities	   of	   the	   failed	   banks,	  mainly	   because	   the	  major	   banks	   –	   Santander	   and	   	   BBVA	   –	  were	   not	   party	   to	   the	   housing	   bubble	   and	   under	   Spanish	   regulations	   were	   required	   to	  
	   16	  	  	  
strengthen	   their	  capital	  positions	  while	  expanding	   their	  operations	  abroad,	  mainly	   in	   the	  European	  Union	  and	  Latin	  America.	  	  The	  third	  largest	  bank,	  Caixabank,	  is	  now	  a	  retail	  bank	  created	   to	   absorb	   the	   activities	   of	   what	   was	   the	   largest	   savings	   bank,	   La	   Caixa.	   	   As	   a	  consequence,	   the	   ratio	   of	   Spanish	   government	   debt	   to	   GDP	   is	   among	   the	   lowest	   of	   the	  eurozone	  countries,	  although	  the	  deficit	  has	  risen	  sharply	  in	  response	  to	  the	  financial	  crisis.	  	  As	  Figure	  10	  shows,	  the	  IMF	  finds	  the	  Spanish	  sovereign	  debt	  situation	  the	  best	  of	  all	  the	  eurozone	  periphery	  countries,	  and	  the	  best	  of	  all	  the	  G-­‐7	  countries	  as	  well,	  save	  for	  Canada.	  The	   debt	   problem	   for	   Spain	   lies	   therefore,	   not	  with	   sovereign	   debt	   currently	   but	  rather	   with	   the	   heavy	   indebtedness	   of	   both	   households	   and	   nonfinancial	   corporations.	  	  	  The	   spending	   spree	   of	   Spanish	   firms	   and	   households	   has	   also	   created	   dangerously	   high	  levels	  of	  external	  indebtedness.	   	  The	  financial	  reforms	  of	  the	  banking	  sector	  taken	  to	  date	  have	  reduced	  the	  overall	  leverage	  of	  the	  banks	  to	  levels	  now	  regarded	  as	  safe,	  as	  have	  the	  other	   three	   peripheral	   countries.	   	   To	   sum	   up,	   there	   remains	   a	   good	   measure	   of	   policy	  leeway	  for	  Spanish	  authorities	  in	  the	  central	  government	  but	  they	  have	  to	  deal	  effectively	  with	  the	  private	  sector	  debt	  problems.	  	  While	  many	  steps	  have	  been	  taken	  as	  of	  February	  	  
Figure	  10.	  Debt	  Comparisons	  of	  G-­7	  and	  Eurozone	  periphery	  countries	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2012,	   it	  remains	  to	  be	  seen	  how	  effective	  they	  will	  be	  within	  the	  context	  of	  more	  general	  measures	  taken	  to	  copy	  with	  the	  pressing	  problems	  of	  Greece,	  Ireland,	  and	  Portugal.	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  solving	  Spain’s	  problems	  in	  the	  long-­‐run	  depends	  on	  increasing	  total	  factor	   productivity,	   now	   that	   the	   Spanish	   economy	   has	   reached	   rough	   convergence	  with	  the	  average	  levels	  of	  per	  capita	  income	  and	  price	  inflation	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  euro-­‐zone.	  	  	  All	  
economic	   analysts	   agree	   that	   this	   requires	   further	   structural	   reforms	   in	   Spain’s	   labor	  markets,	  namely	   to	  allow	   firms	  greater	   flexibility	   in	  hiring	   temporary	  workers	  and	   firing	  long-­‐term	   employees.	   The	   new	   minister	   for	   the	   economy	   and	   competitiveness,	   Luis	   de	  Guindos,	   stated	   firmly	   that	  he	  knew	  what	  had	   to	  be	  done	  and	  would	   see	   it	   through.	   	  His	  three	   structural	   reforms	   were:	   1)	   change	   the	   wage	   bargaining	   system	   from	   centralized	  agreements	  at	  the	  sectoral	  level	  to	  the	  level	  of	  individual	  firms,	  allowing	  small	  and	  medium	  size	   firms	   to	   adjust	   to	   changes	   in	   productivity;	   2)	   simplify	   full-­‐time	   contracts	   and	  encourage	   part-­‐time	   hiring;	   and,	   3)	   “to	   allow	   the	   reallocation	   of	   human	   capital	   to	   high-­‐value-­‐added	  sectors.”	  (de	  Guindos,	  Wall	  Street	  Journal,	  January	  19,	  2012)	  De	  Guindos	  went	  on	   to	   state	   that	   banks	   would	   be	   re-­‐capitalized	   without	   public	   money	   while	   “the	   entire	  public	   sector	  will	   not	   be	   allowed	   to	   run	   structural	   deficits	   of	  more	   than	  0.4%	  of	  GDP	  or	  accrue	  debt	  of	  more	  than	  60%	  of	  GDP.	  	  Spain	  will	  therefore	  be	  among	  the	  first	  EU	  members	  to	   introduce	   in	   its	   domestic	   legal	   framework	   the	   economic	   governance	   agreements	   just	  reached	  at	  the	  EU.”	  (Ibid.)	  	  But	  all	  political	  analysts	  (other	  than	  de	  Guindos)	  regard	  these	  necessary	  reforms	  as	  increasingly	   difficult	   for	   the	   most	   advanced	   regions	   within	   Spain.	   	   The	   relapse	   of	   the	  Spanish	  labor	  market	  toward	  sharply	  lower	  participation	  rates	  and	  higher	  unemployment	  rates	   after	   2008	  was	   stunning	   in	   its	   speed	   and	   depth.	   	   It	   appears	   that	   the	   convergence	  process	  has	  to	  begin	  all	  over	  again,	  but	  this	  time	  without	  the	  help	  of	  either	  foreign	  capital	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or	  immigrant	  labor.	  	  The	  difficulties	  that	  confront	  the	  new	  Spanish	  policy	  makers,	  who	  took	  office	   after	   the	   elections	   of	   November	   20,	   2011,	   are	   compounded	   by	   attempting	   to	  implement	  long-­‐run	  structural	  reforms	  in	  the	  labor	  market	  while	  continuing	  to	  deleverage	  the	   balance	   sheets	   of	   the	   public,	   the	   financial	   sector,	   and	   the	   governments,	   both	   at	   the	  central	   and	   regional	   levels.	   	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	   problems	   of	   Spain	   are	   emblematic	   of	   the	  entire	  process	  now	  underway	   for	   all	   the	  periphery	   countries.	   	  While	  German	   authorities	  can	  point,	  rightly,	  to	  the	  success	  that	  they	  have	  achieved	  in	  making	  effective	  such	  structural	  reforms	  in	  its	   labor	  markets	  while	  maintaining	  relatively	  moderated	  budget	  deficits	  since	  the	   reunification	   shock	   of	   1990,	   it	   is	   worth	   noting	   that	   it	   took	   nearly	   20	   years	   to	  accomplish.	  	  
Spanish	  Banks	  and	  Regional	  Housing	  Just	  how	  well	  are	  the	  Spanish	  banks	  and	  the	  Spanish	  governments,	  both	  central	  and	  regional,	   equipped	   to	   deal	  with	   the	   aftershocks	   of	   the	   collapse	   of	   the	   housing	   bubble	   in	  Spain?	  	  Comparing	  the	  overall	  picture	  of	  the	  banks	  in	  Spain	  with	  those	  in	  the	  other	  major	  euro-­‐economies	  makes	  it	  appear	  that	  Spain’s	  banks	  are	  in	  relatively	  good	  shape	  in	  terms	  of	  the	   structure	  of	   their	   liabilities.	   	  The	  higher	   the	   importance	  of	  deposits,	   for	   example,	   the	  better	  situated	  are	  banks,	  and	  the	  higher	  the	  proportion	  of	  unsecured	  debt	  owed	  to	  other	  financial	   institutions,	   the	   higher	   the	   level	   of	   mutual	   trust	   within	   the	   financial	   sector.	  	  Finally,	   the	  greater	   the	  proportion	  of	   long-­‐term	  wholesale	  debt,	   the	   less	  pressing	  may	  be	  the	  need	  for	  additional	  capital.	  Table	  1	  shows	  clearly	  the	  parlous	  situation	  of	  Greece	  and	  Ireland	  in	  contrast	  to	  that	  of	  Spain	  as	  of	  October	  2011.	   	  Greek	  banks	  owed	  over	  one-­‐fourth	  of	   their	   liabilities	   to	   the	  European	  Central	  Bank	  and	  were	  unable	  to	  issue	  wholesale	  debt.	  	  Irish	  banks	  depended	  on	  interbank	   secured	   loans	   rather	   than	   deposits.	   	   Spanish	   banks	   actually	   seemed	   in	   better	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shape	  than	  Italian	  banks	  by	  these	  measures.	   	  Capital,	  however,	   is	  not	  shown	  in	  the	  BBVA	  table,	   probably	  because	   it	   is	   difficult	   to	   compare	   across	   the	  different	   accounting	   regimes	  used	  by	  national	  authorities.	  	  
Table	  1.	  Comparative	  liability	  structures	  of	  European	  Banks,	  October	  2011	  
`European Banks Structure by country (BBVA, European Credit Markets: On Thin Ice, October 2011) 














France 1932.5 107.3 378.7 6.0 174.1 743.7 3342.3 
Germany 3047.1 973.2 639.5 91.4 188.0 2090.1 7029.3 
Greece 1754.5 71.2 73.5 749.4 40.7 97.5 2786.8 
Ireland 182.2 152.5 16.5 47.9 13.4 83.9 496.4 
Italy 872.8 47.8 133.2 45.4 79.9 418.6 1597.7 
Luxembourg 70.6 2.9 11.4 10.0 6.1 36.3 137.3 
Netherlands 833.9 6.9 63.2 1.4 24.6 388.0 1318.0 
Portugal 176.9 26.8 21.7 4.2 9.9 42.6 282.1 
Spain 1251.5 90.4 124.6 43.3 12.2 422.6 1944.6 
United 
Kingdom 2662.3 391.8 346.4 24.7 139.2 841.5 4405.9 
 12784.3 1870.8 1808.7 1023.7 688.1 5164.8 23340.4 
        
France 57.8% 3.2% 11.3% 0.2% 5.2% 22.3% 100.0% 
Germany 43.3% 13.8% 9.1% 1.3% 2.7% 29.7% 100.0% 
Greece 63.0% 2.6% 2.6% 26.9% 1.5% 3.5% 100.0% 
Ireland 36.7% 30.7% 3.3% 9.6% 2.7% 16.9% 100.0% 
Italy 54.6% 3.0% 8.3% 2.8% 5.0% 26.2% 100.0% 
Luxembourg 51.4% 2.1% 8.3% 7.3% 4.4% 26.4% 100.0% 
Netherlands 63.3% 0.5% 4.8% 0.1% 1.9% 29.4% 100.0% 
Portugal 62.7% 9.5% 7.7% 1.5% 3.5% 15.1% 100.0% 
Spain 64.4% 4.6% 6.4% 2.2% 0.6% 21.7% 100.0% 
United 
Kingdom 60.4% 8.9% 7.9% 0.6% 3.2% 19.1% 100.0% 
        	   European	  banks	  under	  the	  Basel	  II	  Accords	  must	  mark	  to	  market	  any	  securities	  they	  have	   on	   their	   trading	   accounts,	   but	   if	   they	   have	   them	   as	   assets	   on	   the	   bank’s	   general	  balance	   sheet	   with	   no	   intention	   of	   selling	   before	  maturity,	   they	   can	   be	  marked	   at	   book	  value,	  or	  even	  par.	   	   In	   July	  2011,	   the	   troika	  established	   to	  oversee	   the	  Greek	  bailout	   (the	  IMF,	  the	  ECB,	  and	  the	  EU	  Commission	  mission	  chiefs)	  agreed	  that	  Greece’s	  bonds	  should	  be	  marked	  down	  21%	  even	   if	   they	  are	  not	  being	   traded.	   	  The	  clear	   implication	  was	   that	   the	  ECB	  would	   no	   longer	   accept	   them	   as	   collateral	   in	   the	   repo	  market	   at	   prices	   higher	   than	  that,	  while	  it	  would	  also	  take	  the	  “haircut”	  21%	  loss	  on	  the	  bonds	  it	  held.	  	  	  Much	  of	  the	  furor	  
	   20	  	  	  
over	   the	   nominal	   stress	   tests	   performed	   on	   European	   banks	   by	   the	   newly-­‐formed	  European	  Banking	  Authority	  in	  July	  2011	  revolved	  around	  whether	  this	  also	  amounted	  to	  a	  guarantee	  by	   the	  ECB	   that	   it	  would	  maintain	   the	  market	   for	  Greek	  bonds	  at	   least	   at	   that	  level.	   	  With	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  ECB	  guarantee	  would	  hold,	  or	  that	  the	  bond	  markets	  would	   trust	   such	   an	   implicit	   guarantee,	   the	   Banking	   Authority	   estimated	   the	   capital	  deficiency	  of	  EU	  banks	  to	  be	  only	  €2,5	  billion.	  	  But	  more	  Spanish	  banks	  fell	  below	  the	  line	  than	  in	  any	  other	  country.	  
Table	  2.	  	  Financial	  Restructuring	  of	  Spanish	  Banks,	  September	  30,	  2011.	  
	  Source:	  Spain,	  FOBR	  (2011).	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Over	   the	   next	   three	   months,	   however,	   as	   the	   crisis	   in	   Greece	   worsened	   and	   the	  efforts	   to	  deal	  with	   the	  successive	  crises	   in	   Ireland	  and	  Portugal,	   the	  estimates	  of	   capital	  deficiencies	   rose	   as	   high	   as	   €200	   billion	   as	   credit	   default	   swaps	   on	   other	   government	  bonds,	  especially	  Italian	  and	  even	  French	  issues	  began	  to	  rise	  in	  price	  as	  well.	  	  In	  response,	  the	  Spanish	  authorities	  did	  further	  consolidation	  of	  troubled	  cajas,	  injecting	  funds	  from	  the	  FOBR	   in	  some	  cases	  and	   forcing	  mergers	   in	  others.	   	  The	   total	  actions	  are	  summarized	   in	  Table	  2	   (BBVA,	  Financial	  Restructuring,	  p.	   1).	   	  €13.4	  bn	   in	  new	  capital	  was	   injected	   into	  Spanish	  banks,	  €7.5	  bn	  from	  the	  FOBR,	  the	  remainder	  from	  private	  offerings.	  As	   the	  mergers	   take	   place	   and	   former	   cajas	   begin	   new	   operations	   as	   commercial	  banks,	  the	  questions	  still	  remain	  how	  to	  value	  the	  assets	  which	  are	  mortgages	  on	  housing	  developments,	  many	   uncompleted	   and	  most	   unoccupied.	   	  How	   fast	   and	   how	   far	  will	   the	  write-­‐downs	  go	  that	  will	  have	  to	  be	  made?	  	  On	  this	  essential	  issue,	  outsiders	  are	  right	  to	  be	  wary,	  especially	  given	  the	  efforts	  by	  Spanish	  authorities	  to	  convince	  foreign	  investors	  that	  this	  is	  a	  good	  time	  to	  pick	  up	  desirable	  summer	  vacation	  or	  secondary	  residences.	  	  	  	  In	   July	   2011,	   the	   Ministerio	   de	   Fomento	   prepared	   an	   evaluation	   of	   the	   housing	  market	  in	  Spain.	  	  Comparing	  the	  housing	  bubble	  in	  Spain	  with	  those	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  Ireland	  from	  1996	  to	  mid-­‐2011,	  they	  showed	  that	  average	  house	  values	  appreciated	  less	  in	  Spain	  than	   in	   either	   the	   UK	   or	   Ireland	   up	   to	   the	   peak	   (2007	   in	   Ireland,	   2008	   for	   the	   UK	   and	  Spain),	   but	   the	   subsequent	   decline	   has	   Spanish	   prices	   down	   to	   levels	   below	   the	  UK	   and	  comparable	  to	  Ireland	  (as	  shown	  in	  Figure	  8	  above).	  	  They	  noted	  further	  in	  support	  of	  this	  optimistic	  view	  of	  the	  national	  housing	  market	  that	  there	  is	   little	  public	  housing	  in	  Spain,	  that	   85%	  of	   Spanish	  housing	   is	   owner	   occupied	   (although	  33%	  of	   the	   housing	   stock	   are	  vacation	  houses)	  and	  that	  the	  ratio	  of	  average	  rent	  to	  average	  house	  price	  has	  fallen	  back	  to	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pre-­‐bubble	  levels.	  	  In	  sum,	  they	  argued	  that	  most	  of	  the	  adjustment	  has	  taken	  place,	  so	  now	  is	  a	  good	  time	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  Europe	  to	  pick	  up	  their	  desired	  vacation	  home	  in	  Spain.	  





Cajas	  consolidated	   Capital	  
(Eur	  mn)	  Galicia	   <15%	   NovaCaixaGalicia	  (Caixa	  Galicia,	  Caixanova)	   76,117	  Asturias	   <15%	   Liberbank	  (CCM,	  Cajastur,	  Caja	  Cantabria,	  Caja	  Extremadura)	   52,451	  Basque	  Country	   -­‐16.3%	   Kutxa	  Bank	  (BBK,	  Cajasur,	  Kutxa,	  Vital)	   74,242	  Navarra	   -­‐16.9%	  -­‐16.7%	   Banca	  Cívica	  	  (Cajasol,	  Caja	  Navarra,	  Caja	  Canarias,	  Caja	  Municipal	  Burgos)	   71,566	  Aragón	   -­‐16%	  -­‐19.2%	   Banco	  Caja	  3	  (CAI,	  Caja	  Círculo	  de	  Burgos,	  Caja	  Badajoz)	   20,563	  Catalonia	   <15%	   Catalunya	  Caixa	  (Caixa	  Catalunya,	  Caixa	  Tarragona,	  Caixa	  Manresa)	   76,380	  Catalonia	   <15%	   Caixa	  Bank	  (La	  Caixa,	  C.	  Girona)	   273,387	  Catalonia	   <15%	   UNNIM	  (CAM,	  Caixa	  Sabadell,	  Caixa	  Terrasa,	  Caixa	  Manlleu)	   100,231	  Murcia	   -­‐19.6%	   Mare	  Nostrum	  (C.	  Penedés,	  C.	  Murcia,	  Sa	  Nostra,	  C.	  Granada)	   68,061	  Andalusia	  Castilla	  y	  León	   -­‐15.4%	  -­‐22.2%	  -­‐19.2%	  -­‐15.7&	  
Unicaja	  +	  Caja	  España	  Duero	  (Unicaja,	  Caja	  Jaén,	  Caja	  Duero,	  Caja	  España)	   79,355	  
Madrid	   -­‐21.5%	   Bankia	  	  (Caja	  Madrid,	  Bancaja,	  Caja	  Insular	  de	  Ahorros	  de	  Canarias,	  Caixa	  Laietana,	  Caja	  Ávila,	  Caja	  Segovia,	  Caja	  Rioja)	   285,479	  	   	   Ibercaja	   44,906	  	   	   Caixa	  Ontinyent	   980	  	   	   Caixa	  Pollença	   344	  Source:	  BBVA,	  “Roadmap	  to	  Restructuring”	  and	  updates.	  Modifying	  this	  overall	  picture	  in	  light	  of	  the	  problems	  of	  restructuring	  the	  regional	  
cajas,	   which	   financed	   the	   housing	   bubble,	   is	   the	   regional	   disparity	   in	   price	   declines	   of	  housing	   across	   Spain	   after	   the	  bubble	   collapsed.	   	  While	   all	   regions	   saw	  some	  declines	   in	  housing	  prices,	   some	  were	  especially	  hard	  hit.	   	  The	   coastal	  provinces	  of	  Alicante,	  Murcia	  and	  Málaga	  as	  well	  as	  Madrid	  and	  the	  surrounding	  provinces	  of	  Toledo	  and	  Guadalajara	  all	  had	  price	  declines	  greater	  than	  20	  percent	  over	  the	  three	  years	  from	  first	  quarter	  2008	  to	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first	  quarter	  2011.	  It	  is	  useful	  to	  compare	  this	  picture	  of	  regional	  variation	  in	  the	  housing	  market	  with	  the	  regional	  variation	  in	  the	  restructuring	  efforts	  of	  the	  FOBR,	  shown	  in	  Table	  3.	   Clearly,	  the	  major	  restructurings	  of	  regional	  cajas	  undertaken	  to	  date	  by	  the	  Spanish	  authorities	  are	  the	  result	  of	  exceptional	  declines	   in	  housing	  prices	   in	  their	  regions,	  which	  have	  led	  in	  turn	  to	  sharp	  falls	  in	  the	  value	  of	  the	  mortgages	  held,	  if	  they	  were	  to	  be	  “marked	  to	  market”	  as	  is	  required	  under	  Basel	  II	  guidelines	  for	  securities	  held	  on	  trading	  accounts	  by	   financial	   institutions.	   	  As	   increasing	  numbers	  of	   these	  mortgages	  have	  nominal	  values	  higher	  than	  the	  declining	  current	  market	  prices	  for	  the	  properties	  that	  are	  mortgaged,	  the	  new	  banks	  will	  have	  to	  write	  down	  increasing	  numbers	  of	  the	  assets	  they	  have	  been	  forced	  to	  acquire.	   	  Foreign	  investors	  are	  rightly	  hesitant	  about	  the	  long-­‐term	  viability	  of	  the	  new	  banks	  that	  have	  taken	  on	  the	  responsibility	  of	  holding	  the	  mortgages	  against	  housing	  stock	  the	  market	  value	  of	  which	  has	  dropped	  permanently.	   	   	  Recovery	  of	  the	  housing	  market	  in	  the	   Spanish	   case	   probably	   does	   depend	   upon	   a	   buying	   spree	   by	   foreigners,	   as	   the	  unemployment	   rate	   in	   Spain	   has	   shot	   up	   dramatically	   and	   most	   severely	   for	   younger	  workers,	   the	   ones	   most	   likely	   to	   be	   first	   time	   home	   buyers.	   	   In	   August	   2011,	   Eurostat	  reported	  that	  Spain’s	  unemployment	  rate	  for	  workers	  under	  age	  25	  was	  46.2%,	  by	  far	  the	  highest	  in	  Europe.	  
Conclusion	  Under	  the	   federal	  arrangements	  of	   the	  Spanish	  constitution,	  regional	  governments	  are	   responsible	   for	   regional	   housing	   policies,	   as	   well	   as	   local	   services.	   	   Throughout	   the	  ongoing	   financial	   crisis	   since	  2008,	   regional	  governments	  have	  been	   forced	   to	   run	   larger	  deficits,	  meaning	   increasing	   levels	  of	  regional	  government	  debt.	   	   	  Since	  2007,	   the	   level	  of	  debt	   incurred	  by	  the	  autonomous	  regions	  of	  Spain	  has	  doubled.	   	  The	  central	  government	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does	   exercise	   control	   over	   the	   regional	   budgets	   through	   its	   “Budgetary	   Stability	   Law,”	  which	   established	   annual	   deficit	   targets	   for	   each	   region.	   	   If	   an	   autonomous	   community	  exceeds	  the	  target	  deficit,	  it	  has	  to	  establish	  an	  “Economic	  and	  Financial	  Rebalancing	  Plan”	  to	   recover	   the	   deficits.	   	   In	   the	   meantime,	   the	   budget	   differences	   between	   the	   central	  administration	  and	  the	  autonomous	  communities	  are	  settled	  over	  the	  next	  two	  years.	  	  The	  deficits	  cumulated	  by	  2011	  amounted	  to	  approximately	  €25	  billion,	  which	  will	  have	  to	  paid	  back	   to	   the	   central	   administration	   in	  60	   installments	   starting	   January	  2012.	   (BBVA,	  Thin	  Ice,	  p.	  56)	  	  The	   overall	   deficit	   for	   the	   regions	   amounted	   to	   1.2%	   of	   GDP,	   and	   most	   adopted	  expenditure	  cuts	  and	  tax	  increases	  in	  apparently	  aggressive	  measures.	  	  Castile-­‐La	  Mancha	  cut	  its	  2012	  budget	  by	  20%	  and	  other	  regions	  —	  Extremadura,	  Valencia,	  Canary	  Islands	  —followed	  its	  example.	  	  Nevertheless,	  BBVA	  researchers	  estimate	  that	  their	  combined	  budget	  deficit	   for	  2011	  will	   exceed	  2%.	   	  All	   of	   the	  autonomous	   regions	   credit	   ratings	  have	  been	  downgraded	  over	  the	  past	  year,	  however,	  with	  negative	  outlooks	  for	  each.	  (BBVA,	  Thin	  ice,	  p.	  54)	   	  The	  planned	  deficit	   for	  the	  central	  government	  of	  6%	  for	  2011	  is	  also	   likely	  to	  be	  exceeded,	  according	  to	  press	  reports	  in	  October	  (FT,	  October	  13,	  2011)	  and,	  in	  fact,	  the	  new	  administration	  announced	  in	  January	  2012	  that	  the	  deficit	  for	  2011	  would	  be	  8.2%	  of	  GDP	  (FT,	   February	  16,	   2012).	   	  While	   Spanish	  debt	  was	  downgraded	  by	   all	   three	  major	   rating	  agencies,	  Moody’s	  the	  last	  to	  do	  so	  on	  February	  13,	  2012,	  from	  A3	  to	  A1,	  the	  sale	  of	  €4bn	  Spanish	  bonds	   later	   that	  week	  was	  hailed	  as	  a	   sign	  of	   “revived	   investor	   confidence	   in	   its	  economic	  reform	  programme.”	  (Ibid.)	  	  Indeed,	  a	  three-­‐year	  bond	  sold	  for	  an	  average	  yield	  of	  2.97	  per	  cent,	  about	  2	  percentage	  points	  lower	  than	  the	  4.9	  per	  cent	  yield	  a	  similar	  bond	  sold	  for	  in	  August	  2011.	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Nevertheless,	   the	  previous	   three	  years	  experience	  with	   the	  budgetary	  oversight	  of	  the	  autonomous	  regions	  of	  Spain,	  which	  was	  much	  firmer	  than	  that	  intended	  or	  conceived	  in	   the	  budgetary	  oversight	  procedures	  agreed	  upon	  by	  heads	  of	  government	  of	   the	  euro-­‐zone	  countries	   in	   January	  2012	   for	   its	  members	   in	   the	   future,	  does	  not	  bode	  well	   for	   the	  fiscal	   convergence	  of	   the	  periphery	  with	   the	   core	   over	   the	  near	   future.	   	   It	  would	   appear	  more	  salutary	  to	  craft	  a	  specific	  process	  for	  the	  eventual	  Greek	  default,	  giving	  full	  publicity	  to	   the	   resulting	   public	   outrage	   and	   suffering	   in	   Greece	   that	   follows,	   and	   trust	   that	  governments	  in	  the	  remaining	  and	  future	  periphery	  countries	  will	  undertake	  the	  necessary	  structural	  reforms	  in	  their	  domestic	   labor	  and	  capital	  markets	   in	  order	  to	  avoid	  a	  similar	  fate	  as	  Greece.	  For	   the	   longer	   run	   in	   the	   Spanish	   case,	   the	   few	   optimists	   remaining	   in	   Spain	  (national	  stereotypes	  sometimes	  have	  validity)	  can	  point	  to	  a	  number	  of	  positive	  aspects.	  	  The	  spending	  spree	  of	   the	   first	  10	  years	   in	   the	  euro	  was	  not	  devoted	  entirely	   to	   second-­‐homes	  and	  seaside	  resorts.	  	  Indeed,	  Spain	  averaged	  an	  investment	  rate	  of	  28%	  of	  GDP	  over	  the	   period	   2000-­‐2007,	   the	   highest	   of	   any	   euro-­‐zone	   country.	   	   Housing	   investment	  accounted	   for	   only	   8%	   of	   GDP,	   so	   the	   other	   20%	   helps	   account	   for	   the	   extension	   of	  motorways,	  high-­‐speed	  rail,	  improved	  port	  facilities	  and	  airports	  during	  the	  past	  ten	  years,	  which	  have	  combined	  to	  make	  Spain	  one	  of	  the	  most	  open	  economies	  in	  the	  world	  (Spain’s	  Equity	  Story,	  pp.8-­‐20).	   	  Spain’s	  open-­‐economy	  strategy,	  begun	  as	  early	  as	  1960	  under	  the	  Franco	   regime,	   continues	   to	   expand,	   especially	   with	   respect	   to	   Latin	   America,	   as	   those	  countries	  have	  also	  embarked	  on	  open-­‐economy	  strategies.	  	  	  The	   required	   reforms	   in	   public	   finances,	   banking	   structure,	   labor	   market	  restrictions,	  and	  pension	  systems	  are	  well	  underway,	  as	  is	  the	  commitment	  to	  deregulation	  of	   the	   services	   sector.	   	   In	   the	   1990s,	   Spain	   had	   the	   third	  most	   tightly	   regulated	   service	  
	   26	  	  	  
sector	   in	   Europe,	   after	   only	   Greece	   and	   Italy.	   	   By	   2008,	   it	   was	   the	   third	   least	   tightly	  regulated	  service	  sector	  in	  Europe,	  trailing	  only	  Ireland	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom.	  	  (Spain’s	  Equity	   Story,	   p.	   66)	   If	   these	   fundamental	   market	   reforms	   promote	   entrepreneurial	  investments	   while	   the	   banking	   reforms	   enable	   financing	   of	   new	   ventures,	   the	   Spanish	  economy	  may	  continue	  the	  growth	  path	  that	  was	  interrupted	  by	  the	  financial	  crisis	  of	  2008.	  	  But	  this	  will	  require	  focus	  on	  new	  sectors	  where	  technology	  advances	  can	  sustain	  increases	  in	  total	  factor	  productivity,	  unlike	  the	  experience	  of	  Spain	  in	  the	  first	  decade	  of	  the	  euro.	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